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On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua filed suit in the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) charging the United States with engaging in military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua in violation of the Char-
ters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and
of general and customary international law.1 On May 10, 1984, after a
hearing at which both states presented evidence and legal arguments, the
Court ordered the United States to cease its "covert" war against Nicara-
gua pending the determination of the case on the merits. 2 The vote was
14-1, with only the U.S. judge dissenting.3 The Court then held hearings,
in which both the United States and Nicaragua participated fully, on the
preliminary issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. On November 26,
1984, the Court ruled in Nicaragua's favor on these issues by lopsided
margins.4 Faced with a hearing on the merits of Nicaragua's claims, the
United States announced on January 18, 1985, that it would not partici-
pate further in the case.5
Most litigants, of course, do not have the luxury of spurning a court
that has declared its jurisdiction over their case, and on those rare occa-
sions when they do so, they are considered fugitives from justice. The
Reagan Administration's decision to scorn the World Court, after thirty-
nine years of active support, cannot have been made lightly. The basis
for its decision, however, is not hard to understand; it reflects the Admin-
istration's awareness of the factual and legal impossibility of defending its
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actions before an objective tribunal, where, unlike in the political arena,
unsupported allegations do not pass for evidence.
Mr. Rostow's article, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revis-
ited,6 which presumably reflects the arguments and evidence the State
Department would have presented to the World Court had the United
States not chosen to withdraw, is a striking illustration of the flimsiness
of the United States' case on both the facts and the law. Mr. Rostow
contends that Nicaragua unlawfully supports guerrilla groups fighting
the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. To support
this proposition, he relies almost exclusively on one State Department
"report," which, in turn, relies either on nothing at all, or on dubious
confessions by captured Salvadoran rebels made after prolonged periods
of detention while in the custody of Salvadoran security forces. None of
this so-called evidence, as the State Department is well aware, could
withstand scrutiny in a court of law.
Similarly, the United States' claims of self-defense cannot withstand
analysis. Such claims are flatly contradicted by admissions of senior
members of the Reagan Administration, including President Reagan
himself, and, in any event, cannot satisfy the armed attack, proportional-
ity, and reporting requirements of article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
I. Factual Background
The United States' use of force against Nicaragua's sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, and political independence is so well documented that the
U.S. scarcely bothers any longer to deny it. Periodically, however, Ad-
ministration officials have attempted to justify U.S. support for the con-
tras on the theory that such support was designed to interdict traffic in
arms allegedly proceeding from Nicaragua to rebels fighting against the
government of El Salvador.7 This claim is erroneous on at least two
levels. First, arms interdiction has never been a purpose of U.S. military
activities against Nicaragua. Second, U.S. allegations concerning supply
and assistance by Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador are simply falsifica-
tions designed to justify an otherwise indefensible policy.
David C. MacMichael, a CIA employee responsible for assessing and
analyzing all evidence of arms traffic through Nicaragua for the period
from March 1981 until April 1983, has stated that during that time there
was "no reliable evidence to support the Administration's public charges
6. Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited, Il YALE J. INT'L L. 437
(1986).
7. See, eg., Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1984, at A18, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at Al,
col. 3.
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against Nicaragua. Therefore, the use of these charges as justification for
initiating the contra war in November 1981 was false, and the adminis-
tration knew it was false."8
Mr. MacMichael did state in his testimony before the I.C.J. that there
was some evidence of Nicaraguan involvement in arms traffic to El Salva-
dor during the period of the January 1981 "final offensive" in El Salva-
dor, but that there was not enough evidence to make a reliable
determination one way or another.9 When pressed for his personal opin-
ion, he said that he believed there might have been some government
involvement at that time. However, after January 1981, Mr. MacMi-
chael testified that there was no evidence of any kind of Nicaraguan gov-
ernment involvement in arms traffic to El Salvador or anywhere else,
notwithstanding the extensive and sophisticated intelligence methods em-
ployed by the United States precisely to detect the existence of any such
traffic. 10 The substance of Mr. MacMichael's testimony has been con-
firmed by Pentagon officials, U.S. diplomats, and investigations by Amer-
ican newspapers.11
A review of the evidence adduced by Mr. Rostow and the United
States with respect to the subject of arms traffic shows it to be, as Mr.
MacMichael testified, "unreliable . . . suspect and . . . presented in a
deliberately misleading fashion." 12 Mr. Rostow's sole support for virtu-
ally all of his contentions concerning Nicaraguan government involve-
ment in arms traffic is a State Department report entitled "Revolution
Beyond Our Borders."13 Even a cursory glance at that document reveals
that it is nothing more than a State Department propaganda piece, simi-
lar to those routinely distributed by the Department's Office of Public
Diplomacy, in an effort to convince a skeptical U.S. public and Congress
of the imminent danger Nicaragua supposedly represents to U.S. national
8. Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1986, at A19, col. 2.
9. Testimony of David MacMichael (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. Verbatim Record (Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua), CR 85/21, at 21
(Testimony of Sept. 16, 1985) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
10. Id. at 19-22.
11. See, ag., Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1986, atA21, col. 6; L.A. Times, June 16, 1984, § 1, at 1,
col. 5; Boston Globe, June 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Christian Sci. Monitor, May 2, 1984, at 2, col.
3.
12. Testimony of David MacMichael, supra note 9, at 22.
13. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPEC. REP. No. 132, "REVOLU-
TION BEYOND OUR BORDERS": SANDINISTA INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1985)
[hereinafter cited as REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS]. The title of the report is the first
indication of its unreliability. The State Department alleges that a senior Nicaraguan official
once claimed that the Nicaraguan revolution had no frontiers and that this was proof of Nica-
ragua's determination to subvert its Central American neighbors. When pressed, however, the
State Department could not supply a source for the statement. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at




security.14 This report, like the others, is replete with sensational allega-
tions, but devoid of verifiable evidentiary sources. For example, the
pages cited in "Revolution Beyond Our Borders" in support of Mr. Ros-
tow's assertion that arms and supplies began to arrive in El Salvador "by
land, sea and air from Managua" during September and October 1980 do
indeed contain allegations to that effect; however, they provide no sup-
porting citations for the critical allegations. 15
The State Department's technique here is quite simple: it makes a se-
ries of unsupported allegations in a report in September, and then cites
that report as support for identical allegations made the following May.
No doubt Mr. Rostow's article will, in turn, be cited as support for pre-
cisely the same undocumented allegations in the future. This technique
is repeated throughout Mr. Rostow's article. Thus, when Mr. Rostow
asserts that transport planes airlifted supplies from Nicaragua to guerril-
las in El Salvador in January 1981, he again relies entirely on "Revolution
Beyond Our Borders." This "source," in turn, cites only an unpublished
White House intelligence summary and accounts by certain notoriously
partisan newspapers in San Salvador, which do not themselves reveal
their sources.16 This methodology is like opening a box to find another
smaller box containing still another even smaller box, and so on, until
you reach the last box, which is empty.' 7
14. Examples of documented Administration misrepresentations concerning Nicaragua
are legion. See, eg., Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1986, at A6, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1985, at
Al, col. 2. A recent report by Americas Watch found the Administration's approach to Nica-
ragua to be "deceptive and harmful," and to be based on "innuendo," "exaggeration," "distor-
tion," and "misrepresentation." AMECAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA:
REAGAN, RHETORIC AND REALITY 1-5 (1985). The report specifically condemns the distor-
tion of data in State Department annual Country Reports. Id. at 13. Similarly, a subsequent
Americas Watch report concludes, among other things, that "the Reagan Administration has
provided false information to the Congress and the American public about gross human rights
abuses by the contras in an effort to explain away those abuses." AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA, 1985-1986, at 2 (1986) (copy on file with the Yale Journal ofInterna-
tional Law).
15. See Rostow, supra note 6, at 443, citing REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra
note 13, at 6-7.
16. See Rostow, supra note 6, at 444 & n.27, citing REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS,
supra note 13, at 8.
17. In addition to treating unsupported allegations as facts, Mr. Rostow also makes a
number of erroneous assertions concerning Nicaraguan officials and Nicaragua's witnesses in
the World Court. For example, he accuses Ambassador Tiinnermann of being "less than
truthful," Rostow, supra note 6, at 439 & n.9, in a letter stating that Nicaragua votes with the
nonaligned nations in the U.N. According to the State Department's own annual report on
U.N. voting trends, Nicaragua's voting record is very close to that of other non-aligned coun-
tries. In 1985, Nicaragua voted against the U.S. 91.6% of the time, putting it virtually on par
with India, one of the leaders of the non-aligned states, which voted against the U.S. 91.9% of
the time. U.N. Voting Record, 40th General Assembly, News Release from the Office of Sen.
Robert W. Kasten, May 15, 1986 (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
Even major recipients of U.S. assistance voted consistently against the U.S.: Mexico (85.5%),
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Mr. Rostow goes on to assert that the FMLN maintained headquar-
ters in Managua from 1981 to late 1983, and that "Cuban and Nicara-
guan advisers there trained guerrillas for war, and planned and directed
specific operations."'1 8 Once again, the only citation is to unsupported
allegations in "Revolution Beyond Our Borders."19 In effect, he is telling
us that we must believe these allegations because the State Department
made them in one of its reports.
Of course, even if it were true that Nicaragua provided support to the
Salvadoran guerrillas for their January 1981 offensive, that fact would
not support the subsequent creation in November 1981-after eleven
months had passed with no trace of Nicaraguan arms trafficking2O-of a
contra army designed to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. Ap-
parently recognizing this gaping hole in his case, Mr. Rostow attempts to
plug the dike by asserting that "[s]ince January 1981, the FMLN has
continued to receive supplies, including weapons, training, and direction
from Nicaragua and Soviet bloc states."' 21 For that assertion, however,
Mr. Rostow offers no support of any kind, except for a citation to-what
else?-"Revolution Beyond Our Borders," which in turn relies on the
confession of Napoleon Romero, a captured FMLN officer who has
never been questioned outside of the presence of Salvadoran security
forces.22 Even if Romero's "confession" were credible, it would not fill
the gap in Mr. Rostow's argument. Not even the Salvadoran security
forces could coax any specific information about Nicaraguan arms traf-
ficking from Mr. Romero. He merely identified Nicaragua as the source
of certain ammunition shipments. Specifically, he said that during a cer-
tain period his units (numbering between 2000 and 3000 combatants)
Egypt (84.7%), Brazil (84%), Argentina (83.6%), Jordan (85.8%), and Saudi Arabia (86.4%);
Honduras and El Salvador, notwithstanding their dependence on U.S. aid, voted against the
U.S. 70% of the time. Id. The trend is a product of solidarity among nonaligned nations.
Wash. Post, May 16, 1986, at A21, col. 1.
Mr. Rostow also states that Nicaragua's witnesses at the International Court of Justice "cor-
roborated the essence of the story of Nicaragua's support for Salvadoran insurgents." Rostow,
supra note 6, at 446. This is simply false. As discussed, supra text accompanying notes 8-11,
David MacMichael, formerly of the CIA, testified that during the period from late 1981
through 1983, when the contras were fashioned by the U.S. into a mercenary army launching
daily attacks on Nicaragua, there was no credible evidence of Nicaraguan government support
for the Salvadorans. Similarly, Luis Carrion, Nicaragua's Vice-Minister of the Interior, testi-
fied that Nicaragua did not support guerrillas in other countries. Testimony of Luis Carrion
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. Verbatim Record (Case Concerning Military & Paramilitary Ac-
tivities in and against Nicaragua) CR 85/20, at 16 (testimony of Sept. 13, 1985).
18. Rostow, supra note 6, at 444.
19. REvOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 13, at 12.
20. Not even REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, id., alleges the interception of any
arms during this period.
21. Rostow, supra note 6, at 444.




received about 20,000-30,000 rounds of ammunition per month via Nica-
ragua.23 That comes to a maximum of fifteen bullets per man per month.
No wonder Pentagon officials have called Nicaragua's purported contri-
bution to the Salvadoran insurgency "peanuts." 24
Glossing over the glaring lack of credible evidentiary support for his
assertion that Nicaragua is involved in arms traffic to El Salvador, Mr.
Rostow makes similarly unsupported claims with respect to Honduras.
According to Mr. Rostow, the FSLN "provide arms, training, and advice
to various guerrilla groups in Honduras." 25 Again, Mr. Rostow relies
only on unsupported allegations contained in "Revolution Beyond Our
Borders," and, in a variation of the self-citation technique, on an article
by a member of the legal team that represented the U.S. in the jurisdic-
tional phase of the World Court proceedings. 26 Not surprisingly, the
cited portion of that article also bases its assertions exclusively on allega-
tions in State Department reports that do not indicate their sources.
Mr. Rostow concludes his remarks on the evidence by contending that
Nicaraguan officials have admitted that Nicaragua supports the guerril-
las fighting the government of El Salvador. To back up this charge, he
cites a purported statement by Commander Bayardo Arce; again, the
source is "Revolution Beyond Our Borders," which, as usual, fails to pro-
vide any supporting citation.27 Mr. Rostow also contends that President
Daniel Ortega's call for an end to outside assistance to both sides of the
Salvadoran conflict constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of Nicara-
guan aid to the guerrillas. This conclusion, while illustrative of State
Department reasoning, is untenable on its face, given the State Depart-
ment's claim that aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas comes from many
outside countries.
It is not unreasonable to require the United States to produce evidence
to support its charges against Nicaragua. If Nicaragua were really en-
gaged in arms trafficking, such evidence would be easy to adduce. The
United States has invested millions of dollars in aerial surveillance of
Nicaraguan territory and in electronic surveillance of Nicaraguan com-
munications to catch Nicaragua in the act of supplying Salvadoran
rebels. The U.S. also has the complete cooperation of Honduras and El
Salvador, through which any such supplies would have to pass. Intelli-
23. Id.
24. Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
25. Rostow, supra note 6, at 445-46 & n.36.
26. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 43 (1986).
27. Rostow, supra note 6, at 446 & n.33, citing REVOLUTIoN BEYOND OUR BORDERS,
supra note 13, at 23 n.23.
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gence experts agree that under these circumstances, Nicaragua could not
hope to send arms to Salvadoran rebels without detection by the U.S. or
its allies. Yet, after more than five years of trying, there has not been a
single interception of a shipment emanating from Nicaragua.2
Arms shipments to Salvadoran rebels have been intercepted from
countries other than Nicaragua. Indeed, the only arms interception men-
tioned in Mr. Rostow's article occurred in Comayagua, Honduras, in
January 1981.29 What Mr. Rostow neglects to mention is that no evi-
dence of any kind tied the captured arms to Nicaragua; in fact, they were
sent from Costa Rica. In March 1982, Costa Rican authorities uncov-
ered a stockpile of arms in that country awaiting shipment to Salvadoran
rebels.30 Again, there was no connection whatsoever to Nicaragua; in
fact, the leader of the smuggling ring told Costa Rican authorities that
"there was too much vigilance" to ship arms from Nicaragua, and that
"it is easier to do it in Costa Rica. '31
In short, it is evident that the Reagan Administration has no credible
evidence to support its allegations concerning supply and assistance by
Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador or anywhere else. It is therefore not
surprising that the United States chose to withdraw from the case before
the International Court of Justice.
II. Self-Defense under International Law
With certain important exceptions, Nicaragua and the United States
agree on many of the rules governing self-defense under international
law. Among other things, both states agree that governments frequently
28. See, eg., Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1983, at A18, col. 2 ("not a single major shipment of
arms has been captured in or near El Salvador since a Costa Rican pilot was caught in [Janu-
ary] 1981"); Christian Sci. Monitor, May 2, 1984, at 2, col. 3 (according to American officials,
"efforts to find proof of arms flowing into El Salvador from Nicaragua have turned up virtually
nothing").
29. Rostow, supra note 6, at 444.
30. Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 17, 1982, at 5, col. 3.
31. Id. In his Surreply, Mr. Rostow mentions the December 1985 capture ofa Lada auto-
mobile in Honduras. He neglects to mention, however, that the car had Costa Rican license
plates, began its journey in Costa Rica, and was driven by one Elias Solis GonzAlez, a member
of the Costa Rican Communist Party. The car had been driven through Nicaragua, but there
was no indication that it had been inspected by Nicaraguan border guards or that any Nicara-
guan officials knew about the car's secret compartments or contents. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1985, at A15, col. 1. Contrary to Mr. Rostow's assertion, there was no evidence that the
documents found in the car were sent from "the Managua headquarters" of the military wing
of the Communist Party of El Salvador. Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, when
pressed by reporters for evidence that the documents came from Nicaragua, was able to say
only that they must have come from there because "we know for a fact [the guerilla headquar-
ters] is in Managua." Id. No facts, however, were provided then or since to support this




disguise armed attack "in the language of self-defense,"' 32 that a state that
directs and supports "regular or irregular armed forces conducting oper-
ations in or against another state is responsible under international law
for such operations, ' 33 that self-defense must be a proportional response
to an armed attack,34 and that the legitimacy of self-defense turns in part
on its purposes.35 Applying these principles to this dispute, it is readily
apparent that the United States' decision to create and deploy the contras
for the purpose of overthrowing Nicaragua's government does not consti-
tute any form of self-defense recognized under international law.
First, repeated admissions by President Reagan, senior officials of the
Administration, senior members of the United States Congress, and cur-
rent and former contra leaders demonstrate beyond question that the
purpose of the Reagan Administration's policy in Nicaragua is and al-
ways has been to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. 36 Indeed,
President Reagan himself has openly announced that the goal of U.S.
policy is to "remove [the government of Nicaragua] in the sense of its
present structure. T37 Similarly, Director of Central Intelligence William
Casey has stated that the United States would not be satisfied by a treaty
with Nicaragua that barred Nicaragua from acts of external aggression,
and announced that the objective of United States' policy is to prevent
"further consolidat[ion] of the regime."38 And Donald Regan, the White
House Chief of Staff, stated:
We have to get rid of it [the Nicaraguan government] in some way or an-
other. And what we want to do is to try to help those who are trying to
overthrow that communist government, try to force it to have free elections
to allow that nation to have the leaders that they should have. 39
He went on to say that anyone who did not support aid to the contras
would "allow that regime, Ortega and his communist allies, to stay in
power in Nicaragua."'' 4
32. Rostow, supra note 6, at 451.
33. Id. at 453.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Limitations on space preclude the quotation of more than a few of these admissions
here. Many more are cited and discussed in the Memorial and Annexes submitted by Nicara-
gua to the International Court of Justice for consideration on the merits of Nicaragua's claims.
See Memorial of Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S. ), 1985 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Concerning Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua) (Memorial dated Apr. 30, 1985).
37. The President's News Conference of Feb. 21, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
212 (Feb. 21, 1985).
38. DCI Remarks, Metropolitan Club of New York City 9-11 (May 1, 1985) (copy on file
with the Yale Journal of International Law).
39. Transcript of interview with Donald Regan on Meet the Press 2 (Mar. 16, 1986) (copy
on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
40. Id. at 4.
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Of course, different rationales have been advanced at various times to
persuade a hesitant Congress to support Administration policy. As Con-
gressman Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, has stated:
Since 1981, various purposes have been advanced for the covert action
against Nicaragua;
First, the United States sought to interdict the flow of arms from Nicara-
gua to El Salvador;
Then, to force Nicaragua to turn inward;
Then, to bring Nicaragua to the negotiating table;
Then, to bring pluralism and free elections to Nicaragua;
Then, to oust the Sandinistas.
Today U.S. policy statements on Nicaragua, especially those by the Presi-
dent, no longer emphasize the external conduct of Nicaragua but the re-
moval of the Sandinistas. The President says we do not advocate the
overthrow of the Sandinistas if they "would turn around and.. . say Un-
cle." That phraseology is surely tantamount to requiring their removal. 41
The overthrow of the Nicaraguan government has always been the un-
derlying goal of U.S. policy. As Edgar Chamorro, former member of the
contra political directorate, declared in his sworn affidavit to the World
Court:
[O]ur goal, and that of the C.I.A. as well (as we were repeatedly assured in
private), was to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, and to replace
the Sandinistas as a government. It was never our objective to stop the
supposed flow of arms, of which we never saw any evidence in the first
place. The public statements by United States Government officials about
the arms flow, we were told by the C.I.A. agents with whom we worked,
were necessary to maintain the support of the Congress and should not be
taken seriously by us.42
Second, even if U.S. allegations with respect to arms traffic were true,
and even if arms interdiction were really the goal of the United States,
the U.S. response would not qualify as self-defense under article 51. 4 3
Self-defense under that article may be exercised only in response to "an
armed attack." The actions charged against Nicaragua fall far below this
41. 131 CONG. Rtc. H2359 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1985) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
42. Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua) 11 (Affidavit dated Sept. 5,
1985) (copy on file with Yale Journal of International Law).
43. See, eg., Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Law-
fulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 663 (1985) ("even if Nicaragua
were transporting significant amounts of military aid to the rebels in El Salvador, international
law would restrain the United States from intervening into the internal affairs of Nicaragua as




requirement. There is no suggestion that Nicaraguan armed forces have
ever operated in El Salvador, nor is there any credible evidence that Nic-
aragua is "substantially involved" in the rebel operations in El Salvador
or in any other country. Allegations contained in State Department re-
ports cannot create an armed attack where none exists. In this regard, it
is significant that none of the countries purportedly under armed at-
tack-El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica-publiely admits to sup-
porting the contras. In fact, the President of Costa Rica has explicitly
condemned U.S. support for the contras.44 Surely, if these countries
considered themselves to be under armed attack by Nicaragua, and fur-
ther considered the use of the contras to be a legitimate means of self-
defense against such attack, they would not hesitate to say so.
In any event, any response under article 51 to an armed attack must be
proportionate in nature. Thus, for example, "if the attack did not
amount to incursion into the territory of another state, the same should
be true of the corresponding act of self-defense. '45 The U.S. creation of a
15,000-man mercenary army that regularly launches attacks against eco-
nomic and civilian targets deep within Nicaragua-for the purpose of
removing the Nicaraguan government-cannot be considered a propor-
tionate response to purported arms shipments to El Salvador under any
definition of the word "proportionate."
Additionally, the United States (and Mr. Rostow) have completely ig-
nored the procedural requirements stipulated by article 51 for the exer-
cise of the right of self-defense. Article 51 requires that measures taken
for self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil."' 46 This requirement is an important substantive limitation on the
exercise of the right of self-defense, making its exercise "subject to the
subsequent judgment and control of the international community."47
The United States has made no effort to comply with this requirement;
undoubtedly it recognizes that its actions are not taken in self-defense
and that the Security Council, but for the United States' veto, would
condemn U.S. actions against Nicaragua.48
44. Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1986, at A5, col 1.
45. Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, 169
HAGUE RECUEIL 10, 164 (1980). Accord Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1643 (1984) ("counter-intervention should be limited to the territory
of the state" where the conflict is taking place even when "the prior intervention was illegal").
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
47. Waldock, The Use of Force in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 495 (1952).
48. In March 1982, the Security Council produced a resolution prohibiting U.S. use of
armed force against Nicaragua. The U.S., of course, vetoed the resolution. (The vote was 12-1
in favor, with 2 abstentions.) See Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Proposing Negotia-
tion, No Overt or Covert Use of Forces, 19 U.N. CHRON., May 1982, at 11, 18. Nicaragua
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Finally, it should be remembered that the use of force in self-defense
may only be taken in situations requiring an instant, reflexive response.49
The United States has had almost five years to consider its choice of
means of dealing with Nicaragua.50 And even under the Administra-
tion's version of the events, the purported arms traffic to El Salvador has
declined at least since 1983.51 Nonetheless, the United States has consist-
ently escalated its use of force against Nicaragua. In fact, the Reagan
Administration is currently seeking an additional $100 million to fund
attacks against Nicaragua-an amount greater than the amount the
United States admits having spent for this purpose in the preceding four
years.
returned to the Security Council in April 1984, after the U.S. mined Nicaragua's harbors.
Once again, the Security Council's resolution condemning U.S. attacks against "the sover-
eignty, independence and territorial integrity of Nicaragua" was vetoed by the United States.
This time the vote was 13-1 in favor, with one abstention. See Security Council Draft Resolu-
tion Condemning the Mining of Nicaraguan Ports (2529th Mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/16463, re-
printed in 23 I.L.M. 669 (1984); N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1984, at AS, col. 1. Under these
circumstances, Mr. Rostow's erroneous suggestion that "[u]nder Article 51, the judgment of
the state being attacked is final, unless and until the Security Council takes measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security," Rostow, supra note 6, at 455, rings particularly
hollow.
49. Mr. Rostow erroneously suggests that the Caroline formula, confining the use of force
in self-defense to situations requiring an immediate response, does not apply to the dispute
between Nicaragua and the U.S. In fact, as other commentators have recognized, the require-
ment that "actions taken in self-defense must be necessary, immediate and governed by the
bounds of reasonableness and proportionality" does govern the U.S. use of force against Nica-
ragua, whether it is characterized as "anticipatory" self-defense, "collective" self-defense, or
otherwise. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 43, at 665 (emphasis added).
50. Mr. Rostow suggests, in this connection, that other options are unavailable to the U.S.
because "Nicaragua has proved unwilling to meet the United States' concerns." Rostow, supra
note 6, at 456. If by that Mr. Rostow means Nicaragua has refused to cry "Uncle," as Presi-
dent Reagan has demanded, he is certainly correct. Nicaragua has, however, continuously
offered to meet legitimate U.S. security concerns either through a reciprocal settlement or
through bilateral talks with the U.S. Indeed, Nicaragua agreed unconditionally to sign the
1984 draft Contadora accord, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at Al, col. 4, which was then re-jected by the other Central American countries at the insistence of the U.S. Nicaragua also
sought to reach agreement through direct negotiations with the United States in the "Manza-
nillo" talks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1984, at All, col. 6; the U.S., however, broke off those talks
last year. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1986, at A7, col. 1. Nicaragua recently agreed to sign the
current Contadora draft treaty if the U.S. would agree to end its support of the contras. The
U.S. to date has refused to make that commitment.
It should also be noted that the eight Latin American countries directly involved in the
Contadora talks (the four "Contadora" countries of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Vene-
zuela, and the four "support group" countries of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay) have
all urged the'U.S. to halt its aid to the contras and to resume direct talks with the Nicaraguan
government. Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1986, at A9, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1986, at A7, col.
1.
51. Even REVOLUTION BEYOND OUR BORDERS, supra note 13, acknowledges that "the
FMLN probably achieved its greatest military strength in late 1983," and that there was a
"reduction in deliveries" after 1983. Id. at 11-12.
Nicaragua: A Rejoinder
Conclusion
Mr. Rostow correctly observes that "[t]he debate about the law re-
garding the use of force reflected in state practice ought, in a rational
world, to be resolved in favor of reciprocal respect for article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter. ' 52 It is precisely to obtain this result that Nicaragua
brought its dispute with the United States to the International Court of
Justice. In that forum, as in no other, the competing contentions of the
parties may be examined and judged according to international law. The
United States' refusal to present its case to the Court suggests that the
current Administration is not interested in reciprocal respect for article
2(4).
52. Rostow, supra note 6, at 461.
